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Abstract 
 
Animal Promises, Master of Fine Art 2015, Anna Kovler, Interdisciplinary Master’s in 
Art, Media and Design, Ontario College of Art and Design University. 
 
 
 
 
The central focus of this paper is the relationship between humans and animals 
and the way in which it is governed by a system of binary opposition. The idea that 
humans are fundamentally different from and superior to animals has a philosophical 
history dating back to René Descartes and the Judeo-Christian Bible. As an alternative to 
binary opposition a new way of thinking can be called “categorical blurring”, which 
involves removing the focus on overarching categories to emphasize that identity is 
created in relation to other creatures and not in opposition to them. I utilize categorical 
blurring as a methodological approach for creating paintings as a way to express that 
humans are tangled up with animals in a relation that is mutual and co-constitutive. 
Animal body parts spill over into human body parts in these paintings, signaling that 
there is no human without the animal, no animal without the human.  
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 2 
Introduction 
 
 
 
My life is marked with experiences with animals that have felt very profound to 
me. One such experience took place in my village in the south of Israel in the early 90s. 
Stray dogs appeared in the village and the children played with them. Each child would 
call a stray their “own dog”, and although forbidden from living in any of the homes, the 
dogs were played with and fed daily by the children. I called my dog Lady, and what we 
did together remains vague to me but her death does not. The authorities, upon hearing of 
these opportunistic creatures, put out bowls of poisoned milk. As I sat crying, Lady’s 
furry body began to convulse as the poison made her do a sort of dance before becoming 
stiff forever. I knew that I had lost not just some thing; I lost my friend.  
 
What makes a creature killable? In this thesis I argue that binary thinking 
positions humans against and above other animals, and I propose the tactic of categorical 
blurring to challenge such binary opposition. The story of Lady is fitting because it 
illustrates a particular relationship to animals that I see as couched in rigid categories of 
thought that determine not just who lives and who dies, but how creatures live and how 
they die. Lady existed in limbo. She was not officially a pet, and she was not a working 
dog. Lady was considered vermin; she was killable. 
 
That certain animals are treated like children and others are considered disposable 
is one of the paradoxes surrounding the human relationship with animals. Historical 
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genocides of humans include “animalizing” groups of people that are undesirable, of 
placing them into the inferior category of the animal. This illustrates the way binary 
oppositions play a role in supporting exclusion, abuse, and extermination of animals and 
humans alike. 
 
The first section of this thesis serves as an introduction to the binary of human 
versus animal and the biblical and Cartesian narratives that endorse this divide. The 
second section aims to challenge the idea of binary opposition and the myth of human 
exceptionalism, and provides an alternative account of how identities form. This is done 
through a discussion of selected contemporary philosophers who focus on animals, 
including Jakob von Uexküll, Jacques Derrida, and Donna Haraway. The third and final 
section includes an analysis of the paintings that comprise Animal Promises. It also 
positions my paintings within the philosophical discourse of the second chapter, and 
identifies allies in contemporary artistic practice.  
 
The paintings in Animal Promises are created through the method of collage, 
which gives them a patchwork or mosaic quality. Animal parts spill over into human 
parts, edges blur and bodies flow into each other in these paintings. The blurring and 
connection of painted forms serves as an allegory for the co-constitution of humans and 
animals while the collage method creates a jumbled pictorial space, undermining a linear 
or definitive reading of each painting. The paintings in Animal Promises are meant to 
challenge the inherited categorical opposition of human and animal, and provide the 
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viewer with an alternative way of looking at the human-animal relationship. Using a 
strategy of blurring that is philosophical and artistic, I want to show that individuals are 
created through their relationship with others and not in opposition to them. 
 
The idea of categorical blurring appears in Rosalind Krauss’1 concept of 
formlessness, which she developed in her defense of surrealism in the book Bachelors.2 
For Krauss, formlessness entails confusion of traditionally accepted oppositions including 
high and low, male and female, self and other, inside and outside. An image or sculpture 
can be called formless when it displays characteristics of both categories at the same 
time. Krauss argues that this confusion in surrealist photography was achieved through 
the presentation of forms as fluctuating in their identity, or inhabiting two categories at 
the same time. For example, a woman’s upturned head in Man Ray’s photograph 
Anatomies (1929) resembles a phallus while a men’s hat in Untitled (1933) looks 
suspiciously like a vagina; In Self Portrait (1927), Claude Cahun in front of a mirror 
looks feminine on one side and masculine on the other. Krauss refers to this strategy as 
“categorical blurring”, “alteration”, “declassing” and “decategorizing”. Krauss is 
especially interested in surrealist photographs that achieve formlessness through 
categorical blurring that does not depend on actual photographic blurriness or trick 
                                                
1 Rosalind Krauss is an American art historian and critic focusing on 20th century art and the transition from 
modernism to postmodernism. Krauss makes use of deconstructionist, feminist and psychoanalytical 
discourses in her criticism. In Bachelors she discusses nine women artists and demonstrates how each artist 
“feminized” the male gaze. Mary Hamel-Schwulst, “Bachelors: Essays on nine women ‘bachelors’ who 
challenged masculinist aesthetics,” Library Journal 124, no. 3 (1999): 147. 
2 Rosalind E. Krauss, Bachelors (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1999), 5. 
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effects. The woman’s head in Man Ray’s Anatomies is not hazy or vague, the photograph 
is crisp; the confusion is achieved through shape and framing. 
 
In this thesis, Krauss’ concept of categorical blurring is used, but slightly 
differently. While Krauss places emphasis on surrealist photographs that did not use trick 
effects to achieve blurring, these methods inform the paintings in Animal Promises. 
Techniques like double exposure, montage, collage, solarization, and sandwich printing 
were used by the Surrealists to create images and bodies that are sometimes hazy, other 
times fractured, layered, and warped. Animal Promises is in a way an experiment in using 
photo-based collage as a source for painting.  
 
I believe that binary opposition is inadequate for describing the world because 
humans and animals are created through their interaction with the environment and other 
creatures. Rather than each being the opposite of the other, humans and animals function 
in a relation that is interdependent, co-constitutive, dynamic, entangled, and ongoing. I 
propose blurring as an artistic and theoretical method to remove the singular, hard line 
between humans and animals. The removal of strict categories, or the blurring of the 
border between them, does not imply a removal of difference or detail. Rather, once 
overarching categories are not a crutch for understanding, more effort is required to see 
the individuals that were overlooked or oversimplified when the category provided 
explanation. With the paintings in Animal Promises and the following investigation, I 
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hope to encourage viewers and readers to look attentively and closely at the details of the 
intertwined and complex relationship between humans and animals.  
 
 
 
 
WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
 
 
It is impossible to know when the strict separation of humans from animals arose, 
and it has even been speculated that it coincided with the very beginning of language and 
symbolic thought.3 I will return to this idea later, but for now wish to look at the roots of 
this opposition – human versus animal - and the emergence of the myth of human 
exceptionalism. The consequences of this myth appear persistently in the mistreatment of 
animals in factory farms, the widespread degradation of wildlife habitats, and the keeping 
of domestic pets. Human control over animals is occurring on a scale unprecedented in 
history. When and how did this kind of dualistic thinking arise as a widely accepted 
world-view? How and why did humans become categorically superior? In this section I 
will address these questions through an analysis of how binary oppositions function and 
through a discussion of the Judeo-Christian Bible and René Descartes. This account of 
                                                
3 In “The Concept of Enlightenment” philosophers Adorno and Horkheimer state that the schism between 
humans and nature reaches as far back as language. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. “The Concept 
of Enlightenment,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 1-35. 
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the dualism’s origin is meant to provide context for a strategy of “blurring” that I propose 
as an alternative to dualism and opposition. 
 
A binary opposition functions to distinguish between things that appear to be 
fundamentally different from one another, such as humans and animals, reason and 
instinct, truth and fiction, inside and outside, male and female. The differences are real; 
there are tangible, important differences between things in the world. A mouth cannot 
walk and legs cannot chew food; likewise, a bee cannot live underwater and a seal cannot 
design a spaceship.  A dualism or binary opposition utilizes these observed differences to 
create rigid, overarching categories that are exclusive to one another. These categories, 
once entrenched, act as the authoritative explanation for difference, as one half is defined 
by being not the other, creating a self-explanatory and contradictory loop. A binary 
opposition is contradictory because one half of the opposition cannot exist without the 
other, and yet they are opposites.  
 
In a strict dualism, two categories are placed in opposition to each other and 
typically a qualitative judgment follows. Boy is better than girl, high is better than low, 
truth is better than fiction, human is better than animal. In the worldview espoused by the 
Judeo-Christian Bible and scientific philosophy of René Descartes4, the human is rational 
                                                
4 René Descartes was an influential mathematician, natural scientist and metaphysician writing between 
1618 and 1650. In mathematics he developed techniques which enabled analytic geometry while in 
metaphysics he is known for the mind-body problem, a division of the natural world into two parts, the 
material body and the immaterial mind. Descartes is known for his theory that animal bodies are machines, 
and function according to the laws of matter. Gary Hatfield, "René Descartes," The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition).  
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and therefore made of an entirely different substance than the animal. The category 
“animal” throws the extremely varied creatures of the earth into one enormous bag with 
the label non-human. The creature that thinks is a superior creature; all others are just 
beasts, mere animals. This explanation is categorical, definitive, unquestionable, and 
final. It is a concrete wall separating beings thought of as opposites, with humans, as 
extraordinary creatures, in a state of permanent exception.  
 
In Genesis, God grants humans absolute dominion over animals and over all of 
nature. First Adam gives the animals names, and then is given God’s command to “rule 
over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves 
on the ground.”5 The definitive break from animals comes when Adam and Eve sew fig 
leaves for aprons because they have found reason - knowledge of good and evil - and 
become ashamed. Here, it is knowledge that separates human from animal, since before 
reason they walked naked among the beasts they had named and felt no shame and no 
difference.  
 
 Inaugurated in part by the mathematician and philosopher René Descartes, 
Enlightenment thinking emphasizes reason and the sciences as the appropriate ways to 
understand the world. Descartes writes that human reason and the truths known by reason 
and mathematics were given to humans by God, and are the only things that can be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
5 Gn 1:28, Holy Bible, New International Version (Colorado: Biblica, 2011).  
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known for certain.6 Truth and reason are superior to animal instinct and their mechanical 
bodily movement and provide access to virtue, happiness, and knowledge of God. 
Descartes believed that thought and matter are completely different, and since animals 
have no thought, they are completely different from humans. Animals only have bodily 
“spirit”, an internal fire that causes them to move according to the laws of mechanics; the 
animal is like a clock that can be analyzed and understood by humans. Moreover, animals 
do not even have instincts or any learned behavior, because their operations are like that 
of a loom or shovel, which is to say, the animal is machine.7 Descartes argues that 
animals do not have speech, they cannot show that they think, and they cannot make 
themselves understood to us, all of which shows “not only that beasts have less reason 
than human beings but that they have none at all.”8 The conception of animals as 
machines, and the treatment of human thought as the most important, indeed the only true 
thing, was codified by Descartes at the birth of the modern sciences.  
 
 Descartes’ influential elevation of humans is pre-dated by a heterogeneous array 
of philosophers and theologians who did not espouse this view. St Francis of Assisi, the 
patron saint of the environment, believed that humans and animals are essentially the 
same.9 Pythagoras claimed that his soul had once animated animals and even plants.10 
                                                
6 René Descartes, “Reply to Sixth Set of Objections,” in Meditations, Objections, and Replies, trans. Roger 
Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 197. 
7 Gilbert Simondon, Two Lessons on Animal and Man, trans. Drew S. Burk (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2011), 
74.  
8 René Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. Desmond M. Clark (London: Penguin Books, 2003), Part V, 
41.  
9 André Vauchez, “Francis, Nature, and the World,” in Francis of Assisi, The Life and Afterlife of a 
Medieval Saint, trans. Michael F. Cusato (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 275.  
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And yet others, like Descartes, categorically separated humans from all animals, 
elevating them to an exclusive position as superior beings. For the latter camp, the 
exceptional feature of humans was rational thought or knowledge of God, which for some 
philosophers were synonymous.  
 
It is difficult to know how prehistoric people and early civilizations categorized 
animals in relation to humans, but it is certain that animals crossed paths with humans in 
an enormously heterogeneous and varied way. They were hunted for food and clothing, 
feared as predators, sacrificed to the gods, domesticated for protection and 
companionship, and featured prominently in tales and myths as metaphors and symbols. 
The oldest artifacts reveal a close and tightly intertwined relationship. Paleolithic caves at 
Chauvet and Lascaux contain realistic line drawings depicting animals and human-animal 
hybrids. During his reign from 883-859 BC, the Assyrian ruler Ashurnasirpal had himself 
sculpted as a colossal human-headed winged lion, and the Egyptian Pharoah Khafre was 
protected by the god Horos who appears in sculptures in the form of a falcon. John 
Berger writes that in Homer’s Iliad from the eighth century BC, animal suffering and 
emotions are described in an identical way to that of humans.11  
 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Simondon, “Two Lessons,” 33.  
 
11 John Berger, About Looking (New York: Vintage International, 1980), 9. 
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Gilbert Simondon12 argues that many philosophies from Antiquity support a 
notion of continuity between humans and animals rather than the essential difference that 
developed in the Judeo-Christian doctrines and Descartes’ philosophy.13 In contrast to 
Simondon, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer14 argue that the opposition of humans 
and animals and nature predated Descartes and the Bible. It was not the Enlightenment 
and Descartes that ushered in a strict separation of humans from nature as a new 
phenomenon, but it was merely a continuation and intensification of the separation 
already in existence in religion and mythology.15 Adorno and Horkheimer argue that 
although mythology allowed for several gods rather than one, myth still involves a 
distancing of subject and object, because things in nature like wind or animals are also 
gods or demons at the same time. Therefore, they suggest that the schism between 
humans and animals reaches as far back as language and symbolic thought when “the tree 
is no longer approached merely as tree, but as evidence for an Other, as the location of 
spirit, language expresses the contradiction that something is itself and at one and the 
same time something other than itself, identical and not identical”.16 This points to a 
                                                
12 Gilbert Simondon was a French continental philosopher writing from the 1930’s until 1989. He is known 
for his theory of individuation, an account of how a person becomes an individual that is different from 
other things and people. In Two Lessons on Animal and Man Simondon questions the legitimacy of the way 
in which humans are differentiated from all other animals. Aislinn O’Donnell, “Gilbert Simondon: Two 
Lessons on Animal and Man,” Philosophy in Review 33.5, (2013): 406.  
13 Simondon, “Two Lessons,” 59. 
14 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer were 20th century German continental philosophers accredited 
with developing Frankfurt School critical theory. A central theme in their work is a critique of reason, the 
sciences, and many aspects of human social life, with an emphasis on suffering, emancipation and 
compassion. Lambert Zuidervaart "Theodor W. Adorno," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
(2011). J.C Berendzen, "Max Horkheimer," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013).  
 
15 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1-35.  
16 Adorno and Horkheimer, “Concept of Enlightenment,” 15.  
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twofold remove, first away from the unique, individual tree when it is named “tree”, and 
once more when the tree comes to be a god or to also contain spirit. The individual 
vanishes into the concept.17 
 
It is plausible that language and metaphor encourage binary divisions as a way of 
accounting for difference, and for creating concepts. Making distinctions is integral and 
necessary to language, as in when we name a tree “tree” and discern that it is not a “fox”. 
Language and the very act of naming at once enact a distancing and signal their own 
limit, for once a thing is named it is pinned down, boxed in, contained, labeled.18 The 
moment a child thinks of the “I” as it recognizes its own body as distinct from its 
environment, from mother and father, from trees and from animals, there may already be 
too great a distance to overcome between the human and its environment. Thus the 
human capacity for language and abstraction can be seen as both enabling, as a tool for 
conceptual thinking, and limiting, as a mechanism that separates the human out of nature, 
and objectifies nature.   
 
 The consequences of looking at the world through the lens of binary opposition 
are not small and include neglect of the individual connections between people and 
animals and failing to see identity in a more dynamic way than in opposition. The myth 
of human exceptionalism and the categorical consideration of animals as lower in value 
                                                
17 Jean Baudrillard, in Why Hasn’t Everything Already Disappeared? (2009) takes up the idea of naming as 
a sort of vanishing. The individual disappears into the concept, and in a double movement, the concept 
vanishes into the individual. Dreams, fantasies, and concepts vanish once they become facts. 
18 Jacques Derrida, in The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008) equates naming with a kind of death, since 
the name will always outlive the mortal creature.  
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fuels the atrocities inflicted by humans upon animals, and perhaps upon other human 
beings.  
 
 A recent exposition in National Geographic includes interviews with American 
cattle farmers operating feedlots. “One thing I know is, we’re humans, and they’re 
animals. We have domesticated them for our purpose,” says Paul Defoor, CEO of Cactus 
Feeders, the world’s second-largest cattle feeding company.19 Binary oppositions and 
sweeping categories as prescribed in Genesis and by Descartes echo in the words of 
Defoor. In light of the long, entrenched, and consequential history of the myth of human 
exceptionalism, I ask: is there another way of thinking beyond binary oppositions? The 
following section presents a possible alternative.  
 
 
 
I BLUR THEREFORE I AM 
 
 
As twentieth-century philosophy began to challenge the traditions of the 
Enlightenment, the categorical divisions between human and animal were reconsidered. 
The question of animal subjectivity was addressed in the 1920s and 30s by the biologist-
                                                
19 Defoor quoted in Robert Kunzig, “Carnivore’s Dilemma,” National Geographic. November (2014), 
accessed January 13, 2015. 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/meat/.  
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philosopher Jakob von Uexküll20, who influenced subsequent thinkers such as Giorgio 
Agamben in The Open: Man and Animal. Jacques Derrida21 makes animals a central 
concern in many of his essays and lectures throughout the 1990s, and his 1997 Cérisy 
conference address became the book The Animal that Therefore I Am. Finally, Donna 
Haraway22 focuses on animals with a perspective informed by science, feminism and 
philosophy in her 2003 Companion Species Manifesto and later expanded version of the 
manifesto When Species Meet.  
  
 In A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, Jakob von Uexküll 
challenges Descartes’ assertion that animals are machines with a declaration that every 
living thing is not a machine but a subject. Uexküll calls every animal a “machine 
operator”23 rather than a machine, and in this basic way the animal is exactly like the 
human, only with a more limited set of things it perceives and actions it can effect. Like a 
                                                
20 Jakob von Uexküll was a late 19th, early 20th century German biologist and philosopher. Uexküll is 
known for developing the theory of Umwelt, or environment, which studies the way organisms influence 
their environment, their subjective perception of their environment, and the way they make meaning 
according to their perceptions. Stephen Moller, "Uexküll, Jakob Johann Baron Von," Biographical 
Dictionary of 20th Century Philosophers, (London: Routledge, 2002). 
21 Jaques Derrida was a French continental philosopher whose writings span from the early 1970’s until his 
death in 2004. Derrida is associated with post-structuralist philosophy and with a method of analysis he 
established called “deconstruction”. Derridean deconstruction in part seeks to re-conceive the nature of 
self-consciousness, and works towards preventing violence by advocating for justice and sympathy. Central 
concerns for Derrida are the binary relationships that exist in language and finding new ways of thinking 
that can account for paradox, namely that something can be the opposite of something else yet depend on 
the existence of the other. Leonard Lawlor, "Jacques Derrida," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2014). 
22 Donna J. Haraway is an American scholar that brings together the fields of science, technology, 
feminism and Marxism. Haraway’s central focus is an interrogation of technoscience and the ways in 
which science and technology exist in a social context and cannot be abstracted from a social context. The 
figure of the cyborg for Haraway is a hybrid of technology and nature as well as human and animal that 
disrupts the boundaries of nature and culture. Shannon Sullivan, "Intersections Between Pragmatist and 
Continental Feminism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).  
 
23 Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, trans. Joseph O’Neil (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 45. 
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bell that must be swung a certain way to make the bell-sound, the animal is the bell 
operator rather than the bell itself, since the animal must notice a stimulus before acting 
in response.24 The bell only works if someone rings it.  
 
 Uexküll demonstates how a tick is not only a subject, but also intrinsically bound 
up with its environment and cannot be extracted from it, or even conceived of as separate 
from its environment or its object, the mammal. Each animal’s perception organs are 
oriented toward very specific signs in the environment. For example, the tick only 
operates on the stimuli of butyric acid, warmth, and the felt texture of mammal fur. Of all 
the features of mammals, and of the whole world surrounding the tick, only those three 
stimuli exist to the tick and plug into its perception. The mammal is changed through its 
skin being pierced, while the tick is changed as it fills with blood, falls off the mammal, 
and dies having laid eggs. The subject and object are thus created through their 
entanglement since the tick could not be active in its environment without the blood of 
the mammal. And so, writes Uexküll, “subject and object are interconnected with each 
other and form an orderly whole.”25 The subject and object fit together so snugly that it 
could be said the tick and mammal were “made for each other.” 
 
Uexküll concludes with an example of an oak tree that is used by different 
animals in many different ways. The same object (itself a subject) provides a myriad of 
different environments but is “never known by all the subjects of these environments and 
                                                
24 Uexküll, “A Foray,” 47. 
25 Ibid., 49. 
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never knowable for them.”26 This is because every creature “sees” in its own way and has 
its own relationship with the oak. This type of thinking suggests that animals know things 
we don’t know, things we can never know, and in doing so invalidates Descartes’ 
philosophy, dislodging Man from his spot as the only thinking creature.  
 
If humans concede that we are limited by our senses and the specific qualities of 
objects that become signals for us, we concede to a multiplicity of worlds that we do not 
and can never fully know. This line of thinking made A Foray into a foundational text for 
posthumanist thought, because it illuminates an infinite number of different worlds where 
things are only felt and not seen, ones that contain only one smell, or ones where objects 
look completely different than they do to us. It shows that there are different worlds right 
here in our environment, and they will always remain mysterious to us.  
 
 Uexküll’s theory argues that animals are subjects, and that subject and object are 
not opposite or even separate things. Subject and object form a circle rather than two 
opposing points - they complete one another. As such, there is blurring between subject 
and object because an animal or human can be a subject in their own right and an object 
for another animal or human at the same time. There is also blurring in the sense that an 
animal cannot be considered independently of its environment, because its perception is 
structured to attach into objects in its environment. It follows that the categories subject 
and object, individual and environment, self and other, cannot be mutually exclusive, and 
                                                
26 Ibid., 132. 
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fall short if they are treated as opposites. Animals “plug into” their environments to such 
an extent that it is erroneous to think of them as somehow “other” than their 
environments. We are reminded of the inadequacy of individual words and of the 
oppositional paradigm. There is no environment without the individual, and there is no 
individual without the environment; there is a connected web and points of meeting.  
  
This opens up two avenues that are contradictory but must be accepted at the 
same time, which both Derrida and Haraway address. If the boundary between self and 
other is blurry, wouldn’t hunting be like eating one’s self? And if we agree that animals 
are subjects with their own meaningful world, would we not be hunting subjects that 
resemble us? The opposite stance is that the hunter is made for the elk just like the tick 
for the mammal; we do not moralize the tick’s eating, nor should we our own. Uexküll’s 
theory naturalizes killing animals and allows them to be subjects with importance. 
Animals are important and we kill them. Derrida and Haraway discuss such 
contradictions in their account of animals, and agree that the way in which we presently 
treat and kill animals is unethical and unacceptable, not that hunting or killing is morally 
wrong. 
 
 The consideration of his cat’s point of view is of utmost interest for Derrida. In 
The Animal That Therefore I Am, he finds himself naked in front of his cat, suffering a 
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terrible bout of shame and embarrassment.27 He admits that he can never truly know what 
his cat is thinking about his nudity, proceeds to analyze himself, and wonders what the 
cause of his shame might be. He locates the roots of his shame in the Bible’s myth of 
human exceptionalism and in language itself, which has set up a cruel string of 
contradictions and dualisms that render his cat naked but not naked, and himself as naked 
only because he wears clothes. Nudity, shame, modesty, language, and naming form the 
core of Derrida’s winding argument, which takes the Bible and Descartes as its primary 
opponents.  
 
The two causes of human self-declared superiority for Derrida originate in the 
Bible, when in Genesis Adam “called out the animals’ names before the fall, still naked 
but before being ashamed of his nudity.”28 God gave humans the unimpeachable right to 
name and use animals, and the burden of shame for our mortal nudity as punishment for 
eating from the tree of knowledge. In this tale, knowledge is tightly bound up with nudity 
and to know is to cover up. The system of values this activates is doubly against animals. 
First, there is the total control given to Adam through the power of language and the 
power of being the one who names (animals cannot speak or name themselves). Second, 
the distinction of clothes serves as a marker that separates humans from animals and 
represents knowledge and reasoning (animals cannot be immodest). Derrida argues that 
“[what] is proper to man, his subjugating superiority over the animal, his very becoming-
                                                
27 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. David Willis (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), 4. 
28 Ibid., 21. 
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subject ... would derive from this default in propriety”.29 Humans can be improper while 
animals cannot. Through their reason, humans choose between modesty and immodesty, 
and although nudity and shame are God’s punishments for that, it is also these that cleave 
humans from animals and ensure their superiority. Not only do animals not speak, they 
do not know modesty, which is to say, they do not reason.  
 
 Derrida comes to a similar conclusion as Uexküll 63 years after the publication of 
A Foray. Uexküll writes that the objective world is “forever unknowable behind all of the 
worlds it produces, the subject - Nature - conceals itself.”30 At the very end of his 
address, Derrida mounts a similar retort to Heidegger, who wrote that the difference 
between the animal and the human is that the animal cannot apprehend things “as such”, 
that the dog can use the stairs or look at the sun but it cannot think about them “as they 
are”. Derrida suggests that the human cannot know things “as such” either. If Heidegger 
called the dog “deprived” because it understands things only as it relates to itself - it does 
not think about what the stairs are like in its own absence, objectively - then for Derrida 
the human “is, in a way, similarly ‘deprived’ … and there is no pure and simple ‘as 
such’.”31 Humans cannot “take themselves off”; they cannot step outside of human 
perception of the world and know things objectively; this explains the title The Animal 
That Therefore I Am. Derrida seems to be saying: humans are animals, and human 
knowledge is limited like an animal’s. Humans attempt to think of the objective, and yet 
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nature remains mysterious. The human can try to know the elm tree “as such”, with 
measurements, facts, and statistics, but this knowledge is still limited because it cannot 
capture the tick’s experience.  
 
It is precisely this barrier to our knowledge that makes the question of response 
interesting to Derrida. In humanist-Cartesian philosophy, response as opposed to reflex is 
the way of differentiating human intelligence from animal instinct, and it is used to 
discount any communication we receive from animals. The lack of certainty on the 
human’s part as to whether the animal is responding is a symptom of this abyss - the 
mysterious, unknowable perspective of the animal. Animals do not have human language, 
and thus cannot respond in the way humans understand. And so, we are the ones who 
speak, and who give the animals their names, yet take away their capacity to speak since 
we cannot understand what they are saying. Behind the gaze of Derrida’s cat there 
remains “a bottomlessness, at the same time innocent and cruel perhaps, perhaps sensitive 
and impassive, good and bad, uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal and 
secret.”32 Derrida has no clue what his cat is thinking.  
 
At a critical point in the text, Derrida abandons the question of whether animals 
can respond and asks whether they can suffer. “No one can deny the suffering, fear, or 
panic, the terror or fright, that can seize certain animals and that we humans can 
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witness… ‘Can they suffer?’ leaves no room for doubt.”33 Here Derrida steps outside the 
history of philosophy and makes clear his disgust with the cruelty inflicted on animals. 
He demands compassion and pity for animals, also compassion and pity as sentiments, as 
ways of being, and states that it is our responsibility, obligation and necessity to think 
about this issue, and to think about what thinking means. Beyond this, Derrida gives little 
mention to practical concerns regarding animals and devotes the rest of his address to the 
biblically-informed human capacities for shame and naming, and demonstrates how 
many other philosophers who may have called themselves anti-Cartesian were 
nevertheless Cartesian in their opinion on animals. It is here that Haraway picks up on the 
practical, fleshly line of thinking that Derrida does not follow with the question of 
suffering.  
 
 For Haraway, the capacity of animals to suffer is so obvious that she does not 
spend much time discussing its chemistry. Instead, she focuses on the human response to 
animal suffering and addresses the many contexts in which animals suffer as a result of 
human life with them. In both Companion Species Manifesto and When Species Meet, she 
urges that humans must truly look at animals and respond actively to their suffering 
through accepting “response-ability”.34 To accept our capacity to respond would mean for 
humans to look carefully at animals, scrutinize the way they are used, learn about the 
context and web of relations that makes them possible, and minimize their suffering. 
Haraway attacks Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari with the accusation that they are 
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overly abstract about an issue that affects real, individual, flesh-and-bones animals. 
Haraway argues that “Derrida’s actual little cat is decidedly not invited into this 
encounter. No earthly animal would look twice at these authors…”35  
 
One actual context for animals’ suffering is the laboratory. Haraway argues that 
experimentation on animals remains a necessity because it is necessary to use a model 
organism. Furthermore, she argues that it would be criminal for humans to have the 
ability to save people and cure diseases but refuse to do so because it would mean killing 
animals. She calls such relationships “relations of use” which are always unequal, but 
necessary to life. “Try as we might to distance ourselves, there is no way of living that is 
not also a way of someone, not just something, else dying differentially.”36 Haraway 
accepts that in order to live, mortal beings must use the bodies of other beings; the 
question for her is how that’s done.  
 
 Haraway argues that humans have to get better at killing and also get better at 
dying. “Humans must learn to kill responsibly.”37 Not all of the research being done on 
animals is absolutely necessary, and it’s possible that not all human ailments need to be 
cured and therefore require animal testing. Haraway describes a decision-making process 
that would determine whether research is necessary and for the greater good. A cost-
benefit analysis can determine research to be good, but the reasons can never be perfect, 
                                                
35 Ibid., 28.  
36 Ibid., 80. 
37 Ibid., 81.  
 23 
or absolve humans of guilt; “there will never be sufficient reason”38. Killing is always 
wicked, she writes, and we must still ask for forgiveness when we use animals unequally. 
She condemns the methods of most current laboratory and slaughterhouse practices, but 
states that it can and must be done respectfully, and only on a much smaller scale than 
now. Haraway abandons categorical statements that animals are fundamentally different 
than humans and therefore are “killable,” or that animals are categorically equal to 
humans and therefore cannot be used unequally. What is between these categories, one of 
absolute difference, the other of absolute sameness, is what she calls “companion 
species”, and this means learning to live together and to take responsibility for 
individuals and kinds of animals, their histories, suffering, and joy. 
 
Haraway and Derrida share a belief in the inadequacy of categorical opposition. 
In her discussion of killing, Haraway quotes Derrida on the injustice of naming and the 
oppositions that emerge as a consequence of naming and categorizing. He asserts that the 
“general and common category of the animal is not simply a sin … it is also a crime”39; 
Haraway adds, “only human beings can be murdered… every living being except Man 
can be killed but not murdered. To make Man merely killable is the height of moral 
outrage; indeed, it is the definition of genocide.”40 She thus suggests that the 
commandment “thou shalt not kill” should be changed to Thou Shalt Not Make Killable, 
and this would entail living responsibly with the necessity and labor of killing while 
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developing the capacity to respond in “relentless historical, nonteleological, multispecies 
contingency.”41 Haraway is interested in knowing the particular, situated, historically 
created existence of individual animals, and of exercising heartfelt response. Adequate 
responses to suffering would include ensuring that animal pain is minimal and necessary, 
and that the lives of lab animals are as fulfilling as possible, and more generally 
supporting practices that are ethical and opposing practices that are not, and taking 
personal and collective action.  
  
 In addition to the important matter of animal suffering, Haraway makes lots of 
space for the joy of living with animals and being in companion species entanglements. 
She asks: “What if work and play, not just pity, open up when the possibility of mutual 
response, without names, is taken seriously … What if a usable word for this is joy?”42 
For Haraway, mutual response does not mean an equal capacity to respond, but entails 
the different levels of response and response-ability of different creatures. There are 
many examples cited by Haraway of healthy and responsible human-animal relationships 
that she says deserve a future. One such case is the story of dogs, and in particular 
Landscape Guardian Dogs, the best of which is the Pyrenees breed.  
 
 The story of how dogs and people became entangled is widely believed to have 
begun when some wolves started coming close to human settlements to eat their garbage. 
The wolves that could tolerate this proximity bred with similar wolves and gradually 
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became behaviorally different from other wolves, though they remained genetically 
identical. A process of co-adaptation occurred between humans and wolves as humans 
began taking them in and encouraging them to act as alarm and guarding helpers. This 
kind of combination or blurring of “natural” wolves and “cultural” humans is what 
prompted Haraway to develop hybrid words such as natureculture, a combination of 
traditionally opposite terms. It would be a mistake to think of humans as cultural and in 
opposition to the natural world, when in reality human culture is intertwined and blurred 
with animals and nature, and both became who they are through their relationship with 
the other. Haraway’s strategy for expressing this reality is to create a new word by 
removing the space or boundary between two words, literally blurring them together. 
There is no strict distinction between nature and culture for Haraway, and she focuses on 
inheriting the histories of our shared lives with dogs along with all the situated and 
embodied details. “Companion species cannot afford evolutionary, personal, or historical 
amnesia,”43 she writes.  
 
Pyrenees dogs originated from Basque Pyrenean mountain dogs that were nearly 
wiped out in Europe during both world wars. After the wars, the breed was taken to the 
Unites States and kept alive by Pyr enthusiasts, mostly white middle-class women who 
enjoy and breed show dogs. The original dogs were regionally distinct and their type 
formed as a result of the functional standards that shepherds sought, ecological 
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conditions, and the dogs’ own choices to breed with neighboring populations.44 No one 
factor created the breed; it was created through a complex series of relationships. The 
result is a type of dog that is best at protecting herds from predators by patrolling 
boundaries, barking at intruders, and sometimes killing them. Haraway notes that a dog 
with little joy in chasing, no passion for territory, and no interest in working with humans 
cannot be shown how to herd and guard. She emphasizes that the phenomenon, although 
not entirely optional for the dogs, requires willingness and a type of agreement on their 
part.  
 
Haraway sees every sign of the dogs’ enjoyment of their job, on which they 
lounge among the herds during the day and patrol at night. A good guarding dog with 
responsible ranchers makes for a functional and positive companion species experience.  
Haraway emphasizes that the beauty of working dogs is that their worth is not calculated 
by how much they love their owners, in the frequent manner of domestic pets. The dogs 
are not pretend-children for their human owners, but useful, talented, and trusted co-
workers.  
 
The re-education of the breed for practical use on ranches in America was a 
response to the ban on poisons in the 1970s as a method of dealing with coyotes and 
newly re-introduced wolf populations. Ranchers were encouraged to switch to using 
guardian dogs and so worked closely with the dog fanciers who had kept the breed going. 
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All these layers - of places and types of animals, “natural” and “cultural” breedings, 
migrations, policies, stories, work and joy - make up what Haraway calls 
“naturecultures”, “companion species”, and “material-semiotic knots”.45 Stories are 
bound up with bodies, which are bound up with other bodies, and together they form a 
complex web of opportunity, unequal use, play, love and companionship.  
 
 The complex history of dogs and Haraway’s detailed account of the layers of 
relationships that make individual dogs and types of dogs possible represents her general 
approach to inheriting histories and learning to act responsibly. History matters for 
Haraway. There are problems with “pure” breeding, including shrinking genetic diversity 
and resultant health problems, but it can all be done carefully, she argues. There are good 
breeders and brilliant kinds of dogs, and there are puppy mills, operations that are 
damaging to canines and people alike. Put simply, it is everyone’s responsibility to know 
the histories of animals and the local and global webs they are part of, to reject Cartesian 
oppositions, and to actively support positive cross-species relationship. To look away 
from the categories of human and animal means to look at a multiplicity, and although 
this can look blurry from far away, the closer one gets the more details emerge in all their 
historically-specific complexity.   
 
The entanglement and dependence of subject and object that arises in the 
philosophies of Uexküll, Derrida and Haraway can be described as a state of biological 
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blurring, where it is impossible to draw crisp lines around individuals because they are 
constituted through their relationship to others. The biological blurring described by 
Uexküll supports a blurring at the level of language because the terms “self” and “other” 
are revealed to be inadequate to describe the world, especially when they are treated as 
opposites. The limits of language and especially of the category “Animal” led Derrida to 
determine that humans cannot “take themselves off”46 and cannot know what the animal 
is thinking. This abyss, is blurry such that we cannot say anything definitive about it, 
because we cannot see it clearly. For Haraway, blurring is a device used in her invention 
of words such as natureculture, in which two opposing terms are literally fused together.  
 
 
 
 
 
PIECES AND WHOLES, COLLAGE AND PAINT: BLURRING AS METHOD 
 
 
 The paintings in the series and thesis exhibition Animal Promises depict bits and 
pieces of animal and human bodies. In their busy collage aesthetic and small moments of 
abstraction they form affinities with such artists as Robert Rauschenberg and Cecily 
Brown. Through a description and analysis of several paintings from Animal Promises, as 
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well as an analysis of the work of selected contemporary artists, I argue that these 
paintings function in three ways. First, they act as an allegory for the co-constitution and 
entanglement of earthly humans and animals through the treatment of the canvas as a 
space that holds many connected fragments of images. Second, the paintings blur the 
boundaries between truth and fiction, life and art, through a reliance on images from 
popular media – a way of bringing the outside world in. Third, they weaken the ability to 
know or understand the meaning of an image through the use of the collage method, 
which creates a jumbled, uncertain pictorial space with no clear narrative. Together, those 
functions challenge the validity of the inherited categorical oppositions human versus 
animal, truth versus fiction, and life versus art.  
 
The paintings that comprise the series Animal Promises do not lend themselves to 
a straightforward reading. They feature small colorful fragments of painted areas that fill 
the canvas and border one another in a style reminiscent of collage. In Snow Fur (2015) 
(Fig. 1) a white hind leg of a furry animal nudges up to an ape-like open mouth and some 
branches in the top left of the canvas. A beard appears among the branches, beside which 
a pair of hands clutch shut a furry jacket. An upside-down nose borders a pair of shadowy 
perked rabbit ears. Some of the small vignettes are recognizable, while others remain 
indecipherable lapses in the order of representation.  
 
 The paintings are a modest and consistent size, sharing standard dimensions of 50 
by 40 centimeters. The dense patchwork of forms on the canvases, their fairly small size, 
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and the jumbled pieces of half-recognizable imagery draw the viewer in for a closer look. 
At close range, the collaged patchwork of fragments visually breaks down into marks of 
paint that range in size and thickness.  
 
 
Figure 1. Anna Kovler, Snow Fur, 2015, oil on canvas, 50 x 40 cm. 
 
 Lion’s Den (2015) (Fig. 2) is warm-hued and packed tight with pieces of disparate 
bodies and creatures. Patches of leopard print overlap with human hands, a human thigh 
and knee extend at the ankle bone into an animal hoof, a partial smiling human face 
borders an area of paint that is hard to decipher. Extracted from their sources and 
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translated into paint, the pieces of human and animal bodies enter into new relations with 
their new neighbors on the surface of the canvas.  
 
 
Figure 2. Anna Kovler, Lion’s Den, 2015, oil on canvas, 50 x 40 cm. 
 
 In the painting Good Morning Rooster (2015) (Fig. 3), the collaged image 
fragments fit together like a lock-and-key. The stem of an upside-down rose extends into 
a depiction of a leopard where it becomes the shadow outlining its hind leg, while the 
neck and head of the leopard transition into a human limb. Part of an elephant lying in the 
snow, an image appropriated from a painting by Will Gorlitz, borders onto the painted 
likeness of an Allyson Mitchell sculpture, a furry “she-beast” in red underpants. Below 
that, the orange feathers of an upside-down rooster creep into the space above it, where 
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between the leopard’s legs the plumes become fiery blades of grass in that right-side-up 
painted fragment.  
 
 
Figure 3. Anna Kovler, Good Morning Rooster, 2015, oil on canvas, 50 x 40 cm. 
 
 There is a mish-mash of forms in these paintings that overlap and weave into each 
other, giving the impression that they can somehow be deciphered, if only the 
connections between all the pieces were understood. Yet the patchwork resists confident 
interpretation, as there is no obvious reason for the juxtapositions of individual images, 
and no possible single meaning. What is known for certain is that there are human parts 
and animal parts, and they are beside, atop, and beneath one another; they relate through 
their proximity and attachments, through their shared environment.  
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 All of this connectedness brings to mind Uexküll’s description of the oak tree. 
Like the many creatures that share the oak tree but can never know its importance to 
other animals, the fragments of images in a collage share the space of the canvas but 
occupy it in their own way. Like the tick and mammal, the depicted pieces of humans and 
animals remain individual while blurring into the mosaic of their environment. They are 
individual and also comprise an orderly whole - they are self and other at the same time. 
The collaged fragments require each other for the whole painting to be created, there 
could be no collection of images without each individual image, and their differences 
allow for an interesting and complex visual space. 
 
 This use of images from the “real world” hopes to motivate contemplation of the 
current interaction between people and animals and all the layers and complexity this 
entails.  The blurring of human bodies and animal bodies, of “nature” and “culture,” in 
these paintings elicits the question: how do humans and animals fit together in 
contemporary society? How do humans and animals relate, and what are the borders 
between them? The appropriated art images, such as those of Will Gorlitz and Allyson 
Mitchell, add the question: how do stories and pictures tie in with real fleshly creatures?  
 
 The relation between the real and fictional, story and fact, is a traditional 
opposition like the opposition between the categories of “human” and “animal”. In the 
Cartesian tradition, a statement is either true or false, a creature either human or not. This 
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divide plays a prominent role in the history of painting, specifically in the movement 
towards abstraction, beginning with Kazimir Malevich and reaching a peak with 
minimalist hard-edge abstraction and Clement Greenberg’s theories of medium purity. 
An ideal painting for Greenberg would not attempt to tell a story, or pretend to be an 
object in the world other than itself.47 Abstraction, for Greenberg, was a way for 
paintings to tell the truth.  
 
 Questioning the categorical opposition between facts and stories is a key part of 
Haraway’s project of undermining the categories of human and animal. For her, creatures 
are tangled up with each other in “material-semiotic” knots, in which the stories we tell 
are just as real as the facts. She argues that real bodily material existence is tangled up 
with the literary, metaphor, art, fiction, and imagination.48 “The machinic and the textual 
are internal to the organic and vice versa in irreversible ways … the sign and flesh are 
one.”49 If we agree with Haraway that stories and pictures are as real as “real life,” then 
we concede that art is intertwined with life and not somewhere outside of it, that 
paintings are facts and facts are paintings.  
 
 In Animal Promises, the human and animal, as well as the real and imaginary, 
coexist on the same painted plane. Image fragments with a recognizable representational 
agenda nudge up to patches of abstract marks that do not mimic reality but are just “real” 
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paint, abstract marks, or paint as itself. Their close proximity reveals that the 
representational pieces are made of the same substance as the abstract ones, and paint 
comes together to create both truth and lies. Indeed, the figurative is simply a collection 
of paint strokes that on their own would hardly look like a leg or tail. The human and 
animal, the real and imaginary, are equally constituted in these paintings. They are made 
of the same substance, and the limits between them blur in a movement that dislodges the 
superiority of one over the other and challenges their categorical opposition.  
 
 My painting process begins with images I find in nature magazines and on the 
Internet. The cut pieces are always only parts of a human or animal, isolated and 
extracted from the original. A nose is cut out from a whole face, the tip of a dog’s tongue 
extracted from the whole dog, a lion’s mane isolated from the rest of its body. The pieces 
are chosen and arranged according to “alliances” between them such as texture, color, 
and shape. This collage is then used as the source for the painting. In translation from 
print to paint, the borders between the fragments must be negotiated. An edge can be 
painted as a rough line or a gradual fade, and this is decided intuitively and in response to 
individual borders. In the act of painting, the collage elements become connected through 
similarities in color and brush marks that drag across two fragments, connecting them. 
The interconnectedness of humans and animals is therefore physically manifested 
through affinities of color, mode of application, and the literal spilling of discreet forms 
into other forms.   
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 The use of collage as a generative method for these paintings creates an 
opportunity for assembling compositions quickly with access to stacks of magazines and 
printouts from Internet image searches. The hunt for suitable imagery includes poring 
over National Geographic magazines, art magazines and culture magazines, and choosing 
what will be cut intuitively. At times I try to isolate the smallest fragment of a human or 
animal so that it can still be recognized. Alternatively, sometimes I choose and cut a 
piece that makes the identity of the source ambiguous. The result is an interplay between 
recognition and confoundedness which the viewer must navigate as they attempt to make 
sense of the collage. I then play around with arranging the cut fragments into 
compositions, and the easily moveable pieces allow for freedom and flexibility in the 
initial stages of each painting.  
  
 Once the collage composition is resolved the loose pieces are glued down. While 
the collage remains fixed, the painting is flexible. If a fragment is not translating well in 
paint then it is erased and replaced with something new. There is no restriction on how 
much a painting can stray from the collage source, and sometimes the altered fragments 
become the most successful.   
 
 The collage method allows for working with representations of the “real” world 
and putting fragments into conversation that would not otherwise be together. The 
esthetic of National Geographic is one where believability, coherence, and truth are 
principles for the photographs and stories told, and the project of disassembling these 
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images and reassembling them into new configurations undermines the discreet nature of 
the depicted animals, humans, and environments. The act of weaving and juxtaposing 
these pieces, which defines the collage process, thus imparts a feeling of the simultaneous 
existence of different realities and a physical manifestation of their connectedness. A 
tiger from one page of a magazine can become connected with a woman’s hair from 
another page, forming a relationship between the two that was not previously there, or 
was there all along but isn’t recognized.  
 
My method of working includes the actions of visual research, selection, cutting, 
arranging, juxtaposition, pasting, analyzing, interpreting, approximating, inventing, 
responding, judging, and a lot of looking. To paint the likeness of something requires 
looking very closely at the individual source, the colors and shades that comprise every 
nuance of its appearance. Perhaps this close and attentive looking is similar to what 
Haraway’s “response-ability” would require. Individual pieces must be scrutinized on 
their own, at their borders with others, and as part of a whole. Of course a painting should 
not be confused with action and solidarity, but if stories and pictures are real, these 
paintings and the discourse they are part of can act to subvert inherited categorical 
oppositions, which in turn can improve relationships in the flesh.  
 
 Animal imagery is appearing with increasing frequency in contemporary art and it 
comes in different forms. Perhaps the resurgence is a sign of heightened interest in and 
awareness of the plight of animals. Human-animal hybrids are extremely popular, as in 
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the work of Stephen Appleby-Barr, Brian Donnelley, Liu Xue, or Patricia Piccinini, all of 
whom rely to a large extent on anthropomorphic alterations. There are activist art projects 
such as Olly & Suzi’s animal collaborations, which draw attention to vanishing species of 
wildlife like sharks and rhinos. Olly & Suzi track down wild animals, draw them in-situ, 
and give the piece to the wild animals depicted, who mark it by biting it, urinating on it, 
and sometimes taking off with the whole thing. 50 In his discussion of animal imagery in 
postmodern art, Steve Baker positions Olly & Suzi on one end of the spectrum, which he 
sees as ecologically engaged, “animal endorsing” art that aligns itself with 
conservationism or animal advocacy. On the other end is art that is theoretical, historical, 
and skeptical of “culture’s means of constructing and classifying the animal in order to 
make it meaningful to the human.”51 Baker uses Mark Dion’s ironic and witty 
installations to illustrate the latter “skeptical” approach. Dion arranges animal-themed 
objects and live animals in situations that reference taxonomic classification and point to 
the disconnection between categories and life in the flesh. While there are many 
differences between the environmentalist and theoretical methods, Baker argues that they 
share a common interrogation of the concept of “truth” and a similarity in how they 
position themselves as artists.  
 
Stylistically, Animal Promises has an affinity with historical collage paintings like 
those of Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque, Dada collages such as those of Hannah 
Höch, and Surrealist Photomontages. There are also similarities with the paintings of 
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Robert Rauschenberg and Cecily Brown. Rauschenberg is famous for combining 
painting, sculpture and everyday objects, as well as using the image transfer method to 
create collage-paintings for which images became the medium.52 Rauschenberg believed 
that art must include the outside world, and challenged the categorical Greenbergian 
divisions between artistic media. His combines, collages, and transfer drawings have the 
characteristic of a patchwork of images or objects that come together to form a whole.  
 
His work often references mundane social life as well as political figures and 
movements including the war in Vietnam, Richard Nixon and Malcolm X.53 The collage 
aesthetic of disparate images that fill an entire canvas connect Rauschenberg’s work to 
the paintings in Animal Promises. In addition, his insistence that art and life are not 
separate entities, manifested in his choice to make art about world events, ties his work to 
these paintings.54 Animal Promises is a fusion of everyday realities, of life and fact, with 
the imaginary and physical world of art. Like Rauschenberg, these paintings argue that 
there is no “pure painting”, there is no art outside of life or life outside of art - the sign 
and the flesh are one, as Haraway would say.   
 
 The paintings of Cecily Brown are a mish-mash of body parts that oscillate 
between abstraction and representation. Her compositions go right to the edge of the 
canvas, giving them a collage-like, huddled quality. Brown’s imagery derives from 
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pornographic magazines, cartoons, and canonical paintings which are then heavily 
distorted, and traces of which make scarce appearances: “a glimpse of open thigh here, a 
raised knee there, a breast or enormous phallus elsewhere,”55 reads a New York Times 
review. Expressionistic abstract paint marks compose most of Brown’s paintings, their 
fleshy or mint green tones standing in for body parts or the surrounding foliage in scenes 
that intimate outdoor Bacchanal revelry. Sometimes it looks as though a group portrait 
has been put through a blender for a few seconds - there can be only thwarted attempts at 
deciphering what is going on in most of her canvases. Brown states that she “wants to 
catch something in the act of becoming something else”56, and the paintings, with their 
vigorous brushwork, deny any fixed identity to the bodies or scenes.  
 
 It is this impossibility of knowing that connects Brown’s paintings with those of 
Animal Promises. Brown is quoted as saying, “I wanted it to be impossible for the viewer 
to know where they stood in relation to the action.”57 By playing with pictorial space, 
obscuring the vantage point of the viewer, and offering only subtle hints at the content of 
the painting, Brown subverts the sureness of the viewer to know.58 She uses paint to 
subvert knowledge acquired through looking. The human figure is “confined, dissected 
and merged into a melting ground” as well as “part of recognizable landscapes and 
                                                
55 Roberta Smith, “Art In Review; Cecily Brown,” New York Times, January 21, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/21/arts/art-in-review-cecily-brown.html  
56 Brown quoted in Molly Warnock, “Cecily Brown,” Artforum International 47, no 5 (2009).  
57 Brown quoted in Suzanne Cotter, “Seeing Double,” in Cecily Brown: Paintings (Oxford: Modern Art 
Oxford, 2005), 41.  
58 Suzanne Cotter, “Seeing Double,” in Cecily Brown: Paintings (Oxford, Modern Art Oxford, 2005), 43. 
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interiors.”59 There are suggested forms and partial figures, but they are only suggestions, 
as different viewers will see different things in these paintings. Suzanne Cotter argues 
that Brown’s paintings play with the notions of real and imagined. Some parts of the 
paintings recede, creating pictorial space, while others are thick with blocks of paint that 
act as an “intrusion into the real”.60 Cotter argues that Brown’s paintings operate 
somewhere between the two, between fact and mystery.  
 
 The paintings in Animal Promises are created through the method of collage and 
translation, pulling fragments from the world of images and throwing them into close 
contact with one another. In both content and form, story and paint, they suggest that 
individuals are inextricably bound up with their environment and with each other. The 
subject needs its object to be what it is and vice versa. Paint, as a medium for translation 
and connection, allows for the entanglement of humans and animals as a physical 
manifestation on the surface of the canvas. These paintings operate on the conviction that 
truth and fiction are not categorically different and are not opposites. Rather, the pictorial 
is in a co-shaping relationship with facts and truth in Animal Promises as they tell the 
complicated tale of people and animals without the limitations of language and without 
names.  
 
 
 
                                                
59 Ibid. 
60 Cotter, “Seeing Double,” 44. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 My interest in animals has taken a variety of forms in my studio practice over the 
years. The artwork has guided my philosophical investigation, and this investigation in 
turn influences the artwork. The series of paintings I made just before entering the IAMD 
program featured poodles that had been dyed, dressed up and altered by their owners. The 
painting style was crisp, and the idea I wanted to emphasize was the extreme control 
exercised by humans over their dogs. After ruminating on the interconnectedness of 
humans and dogs and the fact that both parties are created through their relationship, the 
pink poodles seemed inadequate to capture this complexity. These paintings were a 
reminder of the outrageousness of some pet owners and the inability of dogs to control 
their own lives, but they did not offer an alternative.  
 
 The process of researching and reflecting on the human-animal relationship from 
a philosophical perspective encouraged me to formulate a clear idea of how I see the 
present reality, how I think it could improve, and what sort of painting methodology 
would communicate this. It was also important for me to figure out whether eating and 
using animals is something I can endorse. I realized that talking about and making 
pictures of animals would require addressing difficult topics like suffering, killing and 
eating, while creating space for love, responsibility and companionship.  
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 The contradictory loop that is created by binary oppositions continues to perplex 
me despite the insights gained through my research. My discussion of language and in 
particular Adorno and Horkheimer’s statement about the contradiction inherent in 
symbolic thought, metaphor, and language complicate my own reliance on language in 
the attempt to solve a problem. I recognize myself as a distinct individual and I also 
recognize my dependence on animals, and the formation of my identity through our 
relationship. I am self and other at the same time, and this paradox is fascinating. 
 
 The failure of my thoughts to reach a logical conclusion could mean that the 
answer cannot yet be named, for if it was named it would be limited, constricted, 
rendered impotent to answer the question at hand. As a consequence of my confusion, 
and a profound dumbfoundedness that overtakes me when I consider this paradox, I have 
made and continue to make work that ends up illustrating the binary division between 
humans and animals. My mind slips into and is entertained by the cyclical consideration 
of difference and dependence, individuality and connectedness, self and other, human and 
animal. 
 
 In this thesis I have presented the concept of categorical blurring and the method 
of collage as promising ways of grappling with the complex relationship between people 
and animals. However, a conceptual solution is inevitably limited by the objectifying 
facet of language, and by my specific perception as a human being. I believe that unlike 
concepts, paint and other artistic media have the potential to reach and express ideas 
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without the limitation of language. I am therefore dedicated to continuing to experiment 
with the collage technique in my paintings in the hopes of connecting with a different 
kind of knowledge and sharing this with viewers. I am fascinated with the mystery that 
nature and animals have despite human efforts to objectify, calculate and understand 
them. And yet I do want to understand animals, and I believe that research is important 
for deeper knowledge. The balance between seeking knowledge and being aware of the 
limitations and inadequacies of knowledge is part of the paradox that animals represent. 
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